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households approaching retirement. As well, we compare asset allocation patterns between those who are
worse vs. better off, better vs. worse educated, married couples vs others, and dualearner vs. single earner
couples. Our econometric analysis of asset allocation choice reinforces priors regarding Japanese lifecycle
asset allocation patterns: households do invest conservatively, other than their family home; they are risk-
averse in their allocation of financial assets; and they appear to over-invest in housing and life insurance, two
assets which enjoy preferential bequest tax treatment. We argue that institutional, historical, and policy
influences explain much of observed Japanese preferences for safe financial assets, and we offer suggestions for
mechanisms that could increase household diversification.
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Understanding how asset levels and wealth composition vary over the lifecycle is of 
increasing interest to economists and policymakers concerned with retirement security. It is now 
clear that rapid population aging is coinciding with grave challenges to traditional institutions on 
which people relied for retirement income.  For instance, defined benefit occupational pension 
plans, once perceived as secure, now face massive funding deficits in virtually every nation. 
Government-run Social Security/public pensions are also seriously under-financed; casting doubt 
on what people in many developed countries have anticipated would be their main pillar of 
retirement security. Equity markets, which for decades in the Western world were believed to be 
the engine of wealth creation, are now seen with suspicion pursuant to the poor stock market 
performance of the last few years.    
As the most rapidly aging nation in the world, Japan is keenly aware of many of these 
developments. In recent years, Japan’s national social security system has been forced to 
undergo several reforms substituting price for wage indexation and various other changes in both 
the benefit and tax formulas (Takayama, 2001, 2003).  Deep funding problems in the Japanese 
occupational defined benefit pension system have driven many firms to terminate their plans 
recently, while others have moved toward defined contribution plans.1 Until the Japanese 
“bubble” burst, equity markets had been viewed as a good long-term bet, but after a decade of 
nonperformance, few now see equities as a safe investment (Nakagawa and Shimizu, 2000). 
These changes in perception suggest that an investigation of household asset allocation over the 
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lifecycle in Japan is of substantial interest not only for Japanese scholars, but for the rest of the 
developed world as well. 
How Japanese households allocate their wealth, and how this might change in the future, 
will also be very important for understanding the impact of ongoing structural change in the 
Japanese financial system. Iwaisako (2003) points out that one aim of the recent structural 
reforms has been to move away from the old bank-oriented financial system and toward a more 
market-oriented system of pricing risk. While the focus of most financial analysis on this subject 
has been on corporate finance and governance,2 we contend that it just is as important to 
investigate how households allocate their funds as they do, and to evaluate what factors influence 
these choices. As the financing of Japan’s business sector changes, so too must household 
finances change in years to come.  
In what follows, we first review available international evidence on aggregate household 
asset patterns for several European nations, the US, and Japan. Next, we turn to a more finely-
detailed analysis of lifecycle asset holding patterns in Japan using a microeconomic cross-
sectional dataset from Nikkei. These survey data, along with associated other information, 
permits us to determine how asset levels and asset mix changes over the lifecycle as well as 
along other dimensions. Finally, we investigate whether factors specific to Japan seem to inhibit 
efficient allocation of assets during both the accumulation and decumulation phases. The 
discussion concludes with an assessment of whether asset allocation could be improved through 
the development of a more comprehensive array of contractual saving and investment products.  
Comparative Household Asset Allocation Patterns: An Aggregate Perspective  
Two stylized facts are brought up whenever household asset allocation behavior in Japan 
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is discussed: first, that the Japanese are enthusiastic savers; and second that their asset allocation 
tends to be extremely conservative.  Table 1 provides partial support for these generalizations, 
drawn from Babeau and Sbano (2003).  First, we note that financial wealth is relatively larger in 
Japan than in Europe or the US, as a percentage of disposable income.  In absolute terms, 
however, the average US household is 50% wealthier than its Japanese counterpart.  Second, 
residential property wealth is highest in Japan of the three regions examined, despite the last 
decade of falling property values.  Third, financial liabilities in Japan are the highest of the 
regions considered, as a percentage of disposable income. Consumer debt is less important in 
Japan then the US or Europe; rather, debt reported consists mainly of housing debt and 
professional debt.  
Table 1 here 
Additional insight is gained from Table 2, which provides a breakdown of financial assets 
by type. Broadly speaking, Japan differs from other regions in having a much lower proportion 
of equity holdings, and a much larger proportion of bank-type deposits. Thus Japanese 
households hold more than half their financial wealth in deposit-type accounts, which contrasts 
with a bit over one-quarter of the (much lower) total in Europe, and just over 10% in the US.  In 
contrast, shares, other equities, and mutual funds make up just over 10% of a typical Japanese 
household’s financial wealth, but they comprise more than one-third in Europe, and more than 
one-half in the US. Given these differences, it is remarkable that life insurance and pensions 
account for one-quarter to one-third of financial wealth in all three regions.  
Table 2 here 
The remaining non-human wealth of the household sector comprises claims on pension 
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plans and social security. No internationally comparable estimates are available on these forms 
of wealth for 2000, but in 1995, such claims were estimated at 73% of household financial 
wealth in Japan, 133% in Europe, and 45% in the US (Babeau and Sbano, 2003). 
Additional Aggregate Evidence for Japan 
The onset of demographic ageing has led to renewed academic interest in issues of 
strategic financial asset allocation over the life-cycle. As McCarthy (2003) has noted, there is a 
burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature which tries to explain household asset allocation 
decisions and how these change over the lifetime. A striking feature of much of this literature is 
that it pays scant attention to the most important non-human assets available to individuals or 
households approaching retirement – housing and social security. We believe that little of 
relevance can be said about asset allocation unless these are included in the analysis. The 
different kinds of risks and returns that are associated with these assets must be recognized in 
any integrated assessment of overall asset allocation choice. But frequently, data on housing 
wealth and the value of rights to social security are unavailable, so that empirical analysis fails to 
consider them. Further, the classical analysis of asset allocation across “safe” and “risky” assets 
(Merton 1969, 1971) encourages empirical analysts to parse assets into these traditional 
categories.  
Several previous studies have analyzed household portfolio choice in Japan. Nakagawa 
and Shimizu (1999) use Tobit and Probit models to analyze why Japanese households are 
reluctant to invest in risky assets. Using micro-unit data from the Family Savings Survey for 
1991 and 1999, they find that “households have become more reluctant to invest in risky assets 
mainly as a result of the deterioration of the profit environment caused by the slumping stock 
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market and because of the precautionary savings motive . . .triggered by the deteriorating income 
environment” (p.15). They also point out that after World War II, various tax-related and 
institutional factors made safe assets relatively attractive. They go on to predict that financial 
liberalization will encourage investment in risky assets.  
Because their analysis was restricted to two years, both occurring after the bubble, 
Nakagawa and Shimizu do not have a stable benchmark against which to measure changes in 
underlying Japanese asset choice. In fact, stock holdings by Japanese households increased 
rapidly in the late 1980s, so the observed fall in the share of equity in financial asset portfolios 
from the early 90s could be at least partially seen as an adjustment back towards the status quo. 
Further, they were unable to examine aggregate household wealth and asset allocation, because 
their data source covered only financial assets. Insurance and pensions were included, but not 
housing or social security. Their analysis therefore omitted the two most important sources of 
non-human wealth for most households. 
More recently, Iwaisako (2003) studied the relationship between portfolio choice and age 
for Japanese households. Using micro-data from the RADAR survey, he devoted particular 
attention to the interaction between decisions to hold stocks versus real estate. He pointed out 
that housing is a risky investment, and that because of high house prices, Japanese households 
are exposed to considerably more leveraged risk than their US counterparts. This effect is 
partially mitigated by the higher down payment typically required in Japan (20%), versus the 
usual minimum down payment of 10% (or less) in the US. 
  In spite of high prices, buying homes in Japan is often preferred to renting, for tax 
reasons. In particular, there is preferential treatment of imputed income under the income tax. 
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Further, there is also preferential treatment of housing under bequest tax arrangements 
(Nakagawa and Shimizu, 2000).   
Detailed Evidence on Asset Allocation Patterns in Japan by Age and Household Type 
Drawing on a range of information, we seek to construct a picture of the pattern and level 
of assets for different household types. The major components of household wealth which must 
be quantified in the Japanese context include: the net value of financial assets, the value of life 
insurance, the value of net housing wealth, the present value of social security entitlements, and 
the present value of pension entitlements.  In what follows, we begin by describing how we 
construct the requisite information household portfolios, and then we turn to the results.  
Piecing Together the Asset Allocation Picture: An Overview of Sources and Methods 
In order to provide a better picture of lifetime asset allocation in Japan by household type, 
we use a range of data sources. We rely for the analysis on the RADAR dataset assembled by 
Nikkei, a comprehensive unit record data set that reports financial asset holdings in great detail. 
In this paper, we use data for the year 2000 (in the future we hope to extend our work to include 
additional years.) The RADAR information on housing allows us to calculate housing net equity, 
and we supplement this with external information on pension holdings and social security 
entitlements. One advantage of using year 2000 information is that it is relatively recent data, an 
important consideration given the probable impact of a decade of recession on asset allocation.  
The RADAR survey for the year 2000 had a usable sample of about 2,500 individuals 
between the ages of 25 and 74 (for additional detail on the survey, see the Appendix). This 
survey provides values of financial assets reported directly; equity holdings can then be 
subtracted from “all financial assets” to arrive at separate valuations of “equities” and “other 
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financial assets”. As such, the RADAR dataset has several strengths and a few weaknesses. First, 
it covers mainly the Tokyo metropolitan area and surrounding prefectures (Iwaisako, 2003). 
Therefore it is mainly representative of the urban segment of the Japanese population. Second, 
while the survey asks questions of individuals, many assets are owned by the households in 
which they reside. So the financially knowledgeable member of a couple (the “one who decides 
their budget”) is supposed to answer the financial questions, while other questions are answered 
by the age-eligible respondent. This approach is consistent with the one taken in many other 
surveys of financial wellbeing (e.g. the Health and Retirement Study in the US), and it is 
believed to generate good-quality financial data for households. On the other hand, household 
assets are reported in toto and cannot be identified according to which person owns which item. 
This makes it difficult to separate out ownership of assets for multigenerational households, 
including elderly persons who live with their adult children. 
The RADAR survey does ask about housing wealth in some detail. Where complete 
information was given, this enabled calculation of the net value of owner-occupied housing (less 
outstanding debt). In about one-quarter of the cases, however, incomplete data were given on 
housing debt so these observations were excluded. It is possible that this introduces a bias into 
estimates; further research will be required to assess this possibility. 3   
Another aspect of the RADAR survey is that it lacks direct estimates of pension and 
social security wealth. However we are able to impute values for these key asset components 
using the fact that these entitlements in Japan are individually-based. Social security has two 
components – a basic pension, and an earnings related component called the EPI. Contributions 
are required for entitlement to either of these benefit types. We have assumed that contributions 
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are made for both spouses in our married households, and that therefore a single person is 
entitled to a single basic pension, and a married couple to two basic pensions. The RADAR data 
do not report labor earnings of individuals, so social security benefits were allocated based on an 
imputed salary. Determining the household head’s estimated salary relied on age-earnings 
profiles for individuals in 2000, differentiated by educational level, published by the Japanese 
Department of Labor.  
Corporate pension entitlements are not captured in the RADAR dataset. It is interesting 
that this otherwise comprehensive survey devoted only a single question to pension entitlements, 
and it simply asked whether the subject received a current pension and its value. No distinction 
was made as to the source of the pension – it could have been a lump sum payment, a corporate 
pension annuity, a private annuity, or even a social security benefit.  We therefore made use of 
estimated present values of pensions reported in Usuki (2003).4  These are distinguished by age 
and educational level. We assume that all salary earners belonged to a corporate pension plan, 
using the salary flag in the RADAR data set to identify these individuals, along with their 
educational level.  
The computations of social security and pension wealth accumulations use the 
Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) approach to valuation rather than a Projected Benefit 
Obligation (PBO) approach. The ABO value has the advantage that social security and pension 
entitlements earned to date are thus computed in a manner consistent with the valuation of other 
assets. For example, the value of an owner-occupied dwelling for a couple age 40 in 2000 is its 
value in that year, not the present value of its projected worth in 2020. Of course, applying the 
ABO principle implies that the reported value of a social security (or pension) entitlement is zero 
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until vesting occurs. In the case of social security in Japan, benefit entitlement occurs after 25 
years of contribution, so the estimates presented below report zero social security wealth for 
households with heads are younger than age 45. 
Our approach, building on RADAR, enables us to generate estimates for all important 
household assets except for life insurance since data limitations preclude quantification of this 
asset class.5  The picture we generate below illustrates the importance of housing and social 
security in the overall wealth portfolios of Japanese households approaching retirement. As well, 
we are able to indicate differences in asset allocation patterns between the better and worse-
educated, married couples and others, the worse and better off, and couples with varying 
employment status. We then exploit the micro-unit nature of our data to carry out an econometric 
analysis of asset allocation choice.  
Descriptive Results 
We next present information on the comprehensive household wealth profiles we have 
devised by age and also by household type. Table 3 provides summary statistics, where we see 
that for all wealth and income measures, means are somewhat higher than the medians due to the 
skewness of the distributions. Social security wealth is relatively smoothly distributed, with both 
the mean and the median household surveyed anticipating around ¥20-24 million in present 
value (about $200-230,000 US as of 1-04); net housing equity vies for second place in the asset 
rankings, but it is far less equally distributed, with the mean totaling ¥24 million while the 
median is less than half that sum. Pension and non-equity assets are the next most important 
asset, but these account for only around US$60-80,000 on average, but only half that for the 
median household. Total wealth amounted to ¥50-70 million yen (US$480-610,000) depending 
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on whether one uses the median or mean, with the latter figure being the higher one. The final 
column reports household monthly income, which in this sample averaged about ¥6-7 hundred 
thousand (US$6-7,000) per month. 
Table 3 here 
Figure 1 gives the overall asset allocation results, where households are distinguished 
only by age of household head.6 A first message to be drawn from Figure 1 is the overwhelming 
importance of owner-occupied housing and social security in Japanese life cycle asset allocation. 
Until the household head reaches his 40s, there is relatively little accumulation of assets in the 
Japanese context.  Only after this age do many households purchase their own homes.  This is a 
later point in the lifecycle than in typical Western countries, partly because of the high price of 
housing in Japan, and partly because lenders generally require a 20% down payment on homes in 
Japan, versus 10% in comparator countries.  
Figure 1 here 
In Japan, social security, and, frequently, corporate pensions, are vested from age 45. For 
this reason, Figure 1 also reveals a sudden jump between the calculated wealth of 40–44 year-
olds and that of persons age 45–49. Home equity increases, corporate pensions rise in present 
value terms, and most importantly, social security becomes vested. Social security remains on 
average the most important asset until we reach the over 65 group, at which point we truncate 
our groupings due to lack of sample size over that age. 
It is frequently claimed that in Japan (and elsewhere) that asset drawdown does not occur 
among the elderly, possibly because of a bequest motive or extreme risk aversion. The 
comprehensive data in Figure 1, however, confirm that asset decumulation indeed occurs in 
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Japan after the age of 65.  Most of the decline observed appears to be attributable to the fall in 
the calculated present value of social security with age, but corporate pensions are frequently 
paid out as lump sums, and their value certainly collapses after the age of 60 in our dataset 
without compensating increases in other financial assets. It seems probable that the lump sum 
payout is often used to pay off the mortgage, and that this explains the sudden, and important, 
rise in housing equity between the 55–59 age group and those five years older. 
We next turn to the employment status of the secondary worker, who is assumed to be the 
wife. Figures 2a – c offer some contrasts in life cycle asset accumulation and allocation patterns, 
as a function of the wife’s market employment status. Once social security is vested, the couple’s 
social security wealth is also higher, though it is interesting that the difference is far less than 
might be expected. This is mainly because of the importance of the basic pension in overall 
social security arrangements in Japan, which remains relatively level over the lifecycle.   
Relatively little additional benefit flows to households from social security if there are two full-
time workers. This may help to explain the relatively low labor force participation rates of 
married women in Japan.  Though much less important, a similar observation can be made about 
the value of the corporate pension entitlement. In fact, couples with a non-working spouse do 
just as well from the corporate pension as do full-time couples, possibly reflecting higher salary 
payments commanded by primary workers with non-working spouses.  
Figures 2a – c here  
Early in the lifecycle, couples who both work full time tend to enter the housing market 
younger than households with a non-working spouse, though not dramatically so. Late in life, 
housing wealth is appreciably higher for couples where both spouses work full-time, and this 
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accounts for most of the difference in overall wealth between these groups late in life. Through 
most of the observed age groups, there is not much difference between holdings of bank-type 
deposits by spouse employment status. 
Finally, aggregate asset decumulation late in life is observed only in households where 
the spouse does not hold a job outside the home.  Reasons for this are unclear: one possibility is 
that where both spouses are working, secondary labor force participants are younger, and 
continue to contribute positively to household wealth even when the household head is over 65.  
Figures 3a and b report lifecycle asset levels and composition for single males and 
females. Early in the lifecycle, a pattern of gradual accumulation is observed. From the mid-
forties, however, clear patterns disappear and interpretation is difficult, partly because of 
changing household composition. Thus some single persons remain unmarried their entire lives, 
while others marry late, still others are married early and become single through death or divorce 
late in the lifecycle.7 Nevertheless, two general points may be made. First, overall wealth for 
singles is little more than half that enjoyed by couples. Second, asset decumulation late in life is 
present for both males and females, but is particularly marked for females. This suggests that 
widowhood may play an important role in this subpopulation. 
Figure 3 here 
Figure 4 disaggregates households by family income quartile. The first panel depicts 
asset allocation in the highest quartile of household income; the second panel covers the middle 
two quartiles; the lowest panel reports results for the bottom quartile. Early in the lifecycle, the 
high income quartile records significantly higher asset holdings than the other groups. Before the 
age of 30, home equity comprises most of the wealth of this group, probably reflecting early 
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inheritance. Through the 30s and early 40s, as more households enter the top quartile, overall 
wealth remains high, but median values indicate pension and deposit wealth become more 
important. 
Figure 4 here 
From the mid 40s, the most important asset differentiating the high income group from 
others is housing. This remains true throughout the lifecycle, although pension and other 
financial asset wealth is also significantly higher for the top income quartile in older age groups. 
Housing is particularly important in the over-65 age group. This may be attributable to a cohort 
effect: household heads age 65 in 2000 would likely have bought into the housing market in the 
early 80s, before the bubble, and even in the face of declining property values in the 90s, would 
still have benefited from the capital gain accruing to housing over the last quarter century. The 
middle income group presents a conventional lifecycle accumulation decumulation pattern. Early 
asset accumulation is predominantly corporate pension entitlements and deposits, home equity 
becomes significant in the mid forties, along with social security, which is vested at that point. 
Decumulation after retirement is mostly due to the decline in the value of expected remaining 
social security payments.  
The most important differentiating feature of asset composition in the low income 
quartile is again housing. It might be expected that, controlling for age, the highest proportion of 
non-owners fall into this group. But median values of other assets are low too, about half the 
value recorded for the middle income group, and less than one third that of the rich. Deposits are 
lower by similar proportions, but in absolute terms are less important. In the lowest quartile, 
decumulation after retirement appears related not only to reducing social security value, but to a 
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decline in home equity as well.  
This latter effect is absent in higher income groups. Its exact nature is unclear. It is 
possible that some poor elderly are selling their homes and moving in with relatives, or into 
nursing homes. They may also be transferring title in their homes to their children. Home equity 
loans and reverse mortgages are not common in Japan, so increasing indebtedness appears an 
unlikely explanation.  
The descriptive material presented thus far offers some interesting questions concerning 
lifecycle asset allocation in Japan. They are probed more systematically with regression analysis 
in the next section.  
Econometric Analysis of Portfolio Allocations  
In this section we use multivariate analysis to investigate several questions that arose 
from our earlier discussion. First, we wish to test the hypothesis that age-related patterns in 
wealth levels and portfolio mix are statistically significant, after holding other factors constant. 
Second, we seek to assess whether household composition influences wealth levels and mix: 
specifically, we can test whether wealth levels are higher, and risk composition changes, if the 
spouse is employed. Third, it is of interest to evaluate the link between family income and wealth 
levels as well as portfolio mix. In particular we can test whether income is nonlinearly related to 
total wealth and wealth components. 
The decision to hold/not a particular asset is investigated with a Probit model in Table 4, 
which reports coefficient estimates for equity holding and housing tenure, estimated separately 
for single males, single females, and couples. We do not report results for corporate pension or 
social security, since these are imputed using explanatory variables as described above. 
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Furthermore in this cross-section, too few non-participating observations exist for non-equity 
holdings to do the 0,1 comparison.  For couples, Table 4 indicates positive and generally rising 
age effects in the equity equation to age 55-64 with a further positive age patterns after that; a 
similar pattern is seen for single women though small sample sizes hold down significance. (The 
reference category is younger than age 35). Equity holding for single males appear to peak at 55-
64 and flatten out thereafter. For housing ownership, the Table shows strongly positive age 
effects again for couples, with the probability of having a home rising to age 75. Small sample 
sizes render many of the age coefficients for single individuals not statistically significant. But 
the clear age-related patterns in equity and housing tenure are confirmatory of the findings in the 
figures discussed earlier.  
Table 4 here 
The Probit models also control on education, household income, and employment status 
of the respondent (and spouse, if relevant). Not surprisingly, education always enters positively 
for equity holding in the singles and the couples’ models. By contrast, education is not 
significant in the housing models, though because we also control on age and income, it is not 
particularly surprising. Household income enters positively in both housing and equity models, 
while income squared has a negative impact; these findings stand out most clearly in the case of 
couples where the sample sizes are larger. The fact that both holding equity and housing are a 
concave function of household income is interesting, suggesting that better-off couples are more 
likely to diversify. Overall the results appear reasonable, though the coefficient on household 
head’s employment status requires some explanation. It proves to be negative and statistically 
significant in the equity regression for couples and the housing regression for single male and 
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couples, and it suggests that if the head is not working, wealth is higher. We speculate that this 
employment status variable may be indicative of the head’s being retired, something we will 
explore in future work.  
Next we turn to Table 5 which evaluates patterns of wealth levels for equity and housing 
wealth for the pooled sample. We use Tobit regression to take into account that some fraction of 
the sample does not hold the asset in question, and hence is censored at 0. It is again interesting 
that there are very strong age effects, as before. Specifically, the effect of age is positive and 
increasing with age, and the coefficients are strongly statistically significant and large in absolute 
magnitude. Furthermore, as people age, their real estate wealth grows much faster than their 
equity investments, by about an order of magnitude. Clearly people still see housing as a more 
attractive form of saving than the stock market. 
Table 5 here 
Turning to other variables, education has a positive effect on wealth levels, though the 
effect is stronger for equity holdings and not significant for housing. Men are more likely to 
report higher equity and housing wealth levels (sex=1 signifies male), and there appears to be no 
difference between married and non-married households. Income effects have an interesting 
pattern: for equity wealth, income enters positively but at a decreasing rate, while in the housing 
equations it has a positive and growing link with wealth. We also explored some interaction 
terms, of which “married*income” and “income*older (65-74)” are significant. 
Additional Tobit analysis disaggregating asset holdings by marital status is presented in 
Table 6. Focusing first on equity wealth, again we see strong age-related patterns in the equity 
level regressions, particularly for couples where the age effect is positive and increasing with 
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age.  The effect of education is again positive but most influential for single females and couples 
(in the latter case, husband’s education is positive while the wife’s is not). Household income 
enters strongly positively for single women and married people; further it appears to be rising at 
a decreasing rate. Perhaps this is not surprising, since traditionally the very rich in Japan have 
been more likely to devote their wealth to real estate than to equities. Since there are limited 
numbers of observations who hold equity (=uncensored) among single males and females, 
regression results for these groups cannot be taken too seriously. Employment status is generally 
negative when significant, which is somewhat of a puzzle unless one hypothesizes that many 
working couples are saving for a house, hence may be unlikely to invest in equities until after the 
home purchase has taken place. 
Table 6 here 
Turning to the second panel, we see results for non-equity financial wealth, which 
include all financial assets except equity and housing wealth. The small number of censored 
observations for singles suggests the results would resemble those from OLS regression. Among 
married couples, there are clear age-related patterns with those younger than 35 having 
substantial savings, and the financial assets dropping suddenly for people 35-44 when they tend 
to purchase their first homes. Thereafter, financial assets are gradually built up again, with 
persons 65-74 finally having more than their very young counterparts. It is interesting that men’s 
education is not significant in any of the models, but more educated women are more likely to 
hold these non-equity financial assets – most likely in the form of postal system saving.  
Household income is positive and statistically significantly related to this form of financial 
wealth, for all three groups, and at a declining rate for couples.   
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The third panel of Table 6 focuses on the levels of household social security wealth, 
which it will be recalled are derived by applying the institutional rules to imputed household 
members’ earnings. This implies that interpreting these regression results can be a bit 
problematic due to collinearity. For instance social security wealth is not vested until workers 
complete a certain numbers of years of employment; consequently respondents younger than age 
44 are ineligible for accrued benefits. This in part explains the rising effect of age after that point 
on social security wealth. Education and employment status tend to be positive when significant, 
except in the case of wives’ education in the couples equation. Household income is positive but 
not generally significant, probably because of collinearity with age and education controls used 
in constructing the social security wealth measures.  For this reason these estimates should be 
seen as descriptive rather than causal. 
Next we turn to the fourth panel of Table 6, which describes observed patterns of housing 
wealth. Age-related patterns are again very strong, particularly for couples: the pattern of 
housing wealth rises substantially to age 64, and then levels off. For singles, housing values 
appear to peak in the 55-64 age range, possibly before retirement. This may reflect the fact that 
older men and women may give up their homes to move in with their children when they lose a 
spouse.  The relationship with income is generally positive and, surprisingly, in the married 
couples regression, the squared term is positive and significant. This implies that Japanese 
households invest more of their income/wealth proportionally in housing wealth, as income 
increases. These contrasts sharply with equity wealth, where richer people invest less than 
proportionally as income rises.  Once again we find that education is generally positively 
associated with housing wealth, though weakly. It is surprising that male employment has a 
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negative association with levels of housing wealth for both single men and couples; again this 
may signal that well-to-do retirees are more likely to have a substantial housing asset.   
Factors associated with total net wealth in Table 7, where the first three panels focus on 
the levels of wealth, while the last panel uses the natural log of wealth as the dependent variable. 
Once again, strong and significant age-related patterns are found for all specifications. In the 
levels specification, total wealth takes a dip in the 35-44 age range and then climbs after that; the 
dip is not important in the regressions using the natural log of wealth, however. Total wealth then 
grows rapidly from the mid 40’s onward, with the pattern flattening among the age 65-74 
retirement-age group. Again, we confirm that total wealth is greater among households with 
better educated heads. Marriage, employment status, and male headship appear to have positive 
but not statistically significant associations with total wealth. Household income is positively and 
strongly associated with higher wealth in the level and log specifications, and the marginal rate 
of increase is also increasing in income. 
Table 7 here 
In sum, the multivariate results regarding asset holdings and wealth levels in this section 
may be summarized as follows. First, holding other factors constant, older people are more likely 
to participate in equity and housing markets, in the Japanese RADAR data. Second, older people 
hold greater levels of both equity and housing wealth. Third, similar positive links between age 
and levels of non-equity financial wealth and social security are discerned.  Fourth, total wealth 
is increasing in age.  Fifth, holdings of equity, housing wealth, and total wealth all increase with 
income. However, the mix changes with age: people tend to invest proportionally more in real 
estate and less in equity as their incomes increase. As to the other factors considered such as 
 
 
20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
marriage and sex of household head, only education has a consistently positive impact on equity 
holdings, housing wealth, and total wealth. Having a working wife has a negative impact on 
equity holdings, a positive impact on social security wealth, and no statistically significant effect 
on non-equity financial wealth or housing wealth. 
Product Mix and Policy Reform 
Our detailed investigation of lifecycle asset allocation patterns in Japan reinforces many 
popular priors: that households invest conservatively, other than their family home; that they are 
risk-averse in their allocation of financial assets; that they have a strong bequest motive 
generating over-investment in housing and life insurance, the two widely available assets which 
enjoy preferential bequest tax treatment.  These results are important inasmuch as they flow from 
a much more complete measure of financial and non-financial household wealth than that used in 
prior analyses.  
It should be noted that these choices do not necessarily imply that the Japanese are much 
more risk-averse than their counterparts in other countries. In the realm of financial assets, the 
best returns available over the last 20 years in broadly defined Yen-denominated asset classes 
have been in bank-type deposits. Purchases of foreign-denominated securities, while possible, 
have been cumbersome in Japan (and elsewhere), and buyers of international assets also confront 
the additional inhibitor of exchange rate risk. As well, over this period, the riskiness of 
residential real estate has been revealed to Japanese households more emphatically than to any 
other developed nation. During the asset boom of the 80s, Japanese household purchases of 
equities did rise substantially, in spite of cumbersome transactions procedures. Finally, the 
Government has reduced social security benefits in the face of rapid population aging, and 
 
 
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
households may rationally anticipate further reductions in the future. 
It therefore seems possible that the differences between the household asset allocation in 
Japan and other developed regions of the world may be reasonably explained by an appeal to 
institutions and policies, and not solely by arguing that Japanese households have extremely risk-
averse preferences by international norms. As noted above, a number of tax and regulated 
institutions were introduced after World War II which offered preference towards bank-type 
deposits.   
It is therefore worth considering whether policy and product reform may go some 
distance towards generating a household-based asset allocation which might support greater 
diversification in Japan in the future. This idea appears to underlie the “Big Bang” policy reform, 
and is one motivation for introducing DC pension plans (Cerulli Associates, 2003). The 
relatively low proportion of corporate pension wealth in household portfolios revealed by our 
calculations suggests that there may be inhibitors to investment and returns with these products. 
The assets tax on certain kinds of pensions, including the new DC pension, is for the moment 
suspended. But the threat of its re-introduction at some future time will deter many households 
from making voluntary contributions to these plans. A 1% assets tax translates into an effective 
tax rate of perhaps 30% of benefits over the lifecycle, and is therefore much more severe than the 
rate, expressed as a percentage of assets, suggests.  Related, the current low ceiling on DC 
contributions inhibits the use of these plans for serious retirement saving. 
Low pension investment also raises questions about the adequacy of longevity insurance. 
What pension wealth there is tends to be taken as a lump sum, although commutation rules are 
such that annuities are currently becoming somewhat more popular. Annuity and pension 
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taxation, however, could be adjusted to favor these types of products. 
This aspect of lifecycle asset allocation – the mortality insurance aspect – is given 
practically no attention in the literature, at least in the broader context of strategic asset 
allocation. Relative to a typical OECD country, Japanese households purchase more life and less 
longevity insurance. The greater longevity of the Japanese would suggest that the opposite might 
have been observed, although later retirement ages in Japan would work in the opposite 
direction. 
Life insurance can of course be held as an offset against over-annuitization through 
mandatory or public schemes (Bernheim 1991). Our analysis for the moment omits life insurance 
holdings at the household level, but available evidence indicates this is an unlikely motive for 
holding life insurance in the Japanese case. Annuitization through social security is not overly 
generous. The best explanation is that life insurance is a preferential vehicle under the bequest 
tax legislation. In aggregate, some 17% of financial assets are held in this form, compared with 
10% in Europe and the USA. Bequest tax reform might be expected therefore to release 
considerable funds into the financial market in more flexible forms available for investment. 
The importance of owner-occupied housing in household portfolios suggests that 
products could be developed which allowed greater flexibility in the use to which this wealth is 
put.  Our data suggest that many households simultaneously hold substantial bank-type deposits 
simultaneously with a mortgage, suggesting that bank-type accounts allowing mobility of funds 
between mortgage and deposit accounts may be a useful innovation. Mortgage contracts may be 
written with inflexible terms, and we have ascertained that mortgages in Japan are recourse 
loans, as opposed to the US, where they are effectively non-recourse (except for the very rich). 
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Home equity loans existed in the 1980s, but are not now readily available.  Recent evidence 
indicates the feasibility of introducing reverse mortgage contracts into Japan, along with the 
possibility of using this mechanism to help finance long term care (Mitchell and Piggott, 2004). 
A range of policies might be enumerated that would facilitate and support these kinds of 
product innovations. They include the issue of government bonds which are inflation-indexed, to 
permit annuity issuers to immunize against future inflation while issuing annuities with constant 
real value; and the issue of survivor bonds, which would do the same thing for longevity risk 
faced by annuity issuers. Both these would enable annuity issuers to price their product more 
attractively.  
  Secondly, taxation issues are important in understanding asset allocation decisions of 
households, and there are a number of tax reforms which may encourage more efficient asset 
allocation. Some of these have been flagged above. Others include the development of tax-
preferred individual retirement accounts, and more neutral treatment of risk in the income tax.  
Conclusions and Future Research  
This study has evaluated household asset patterns over the lifecycle in Japan, with some 
comparisons where available for several European nations and the US.  Our analysis of life-cycle 
asset holding patterns used the RADAR data set to evaluate whether factors specific to Japan 
appear to inhibit efficient allocation of assets during both the accumulation and decumulation 
phases. We also consider how asset allocation might be improved through the development of a 
more comprehensive array of contractual saving and investment products. Taking account of 
home ownership and household claims on social security as well as financial assets and pensions, 
we investigate both the level and composition of assets.  
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Our multivariate analysis is the first to focus on the age patterns of wealth holding and 
wealth levels in Japan. Most importantly, we find that, holding other factors constant, older 
people are more likely to participate in equity and housing markets. We also conclude that older 
people hold greater levels of both equity and housing wealth, and positive links between age and 
levels of non-equity financial wealth and social security are also found.  The evidence also 
indicates that total wealth is increasing in age.  The analysis also showed that holdings of equity, 
housing wealth, and total wealth all increase with income, but the mix changes with age: people 
tend to invest proportionally more in real estate and less in equity as their incomes increase. As 
to the other factors considered such as marriage and sex of household head, only education has a 
consistently positive impact on equity holdings, housing wealth, and total wealth. Having a 
working wife has a negative impact on equity holdings, a positive impact on social security 
wealth, and no statistically significant effect on non-equity financial wealth or housing wealth. 
Additional research would be useful to extend the work begun in this paper. For example, 
we would find it particularly interesting to extend the analysis to additional years of data, which 
can be done with the RADAR data. This would enable additional analysis of age versus cohort 
effects alluded to earlier.  It would also be of substantial interest to meet with the Nikkei survey 
section and seek to add additional survey questions regarding respondent labor earnings, the cash 
value of household insurance policies (or their face values and times to maturity), and pension 
expectations.  A final and very important undertaking would be to add to the wealth figures 
computed here some amount representing the value of national health entitlements, as well as 
future long-term care entitlements. Of course these would need to be incorporated net of tax, to 
produce the proper expected discounted net value of benefit flows. 
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Appendix:  Sources and methods for housing, social security, and pension estimates. 
 
Since 1983 Nikkei has conducted an annual Consumer Financial Behavior Survey,8 a paper and 
pencil survey administered to 4500 men and women between ages 25 and 74 randomly residing 
within a 40 km radius centering on Tokyo Station. Response rates are around 57%. The survey, 
32 pages in length, asks numerous questions about household financial behavior on saving, 
investment, credit, and loans as well as current topics.   
 
The RADAR data did not adequately account for three important sources of private wealth which 
we make corrections for in the present study. They are housing, especially housing debt; social 
security; and occupational pensions. In this appendix, we provide a summary of our approach to 
valuing each of these net wealth components. 
 
 Housing Equity 
 
The RADAR data did report an estimate of the market value of housing, the annual loan 
repayment, and the remaining period of the mortgage. We assume an interest rate of 5%, and are 
able to calculate net home equity according to:  
Net Home Equity p
i
iAE
n
×
+−
−=
)1(1  where 
 A: Market of housing 
 p: Annual repayment amount 
 n: Remaining period of repayment of housing loan 
 i:  Rate of interest 
 
Results are incorporated into our estimates of overall wealth. 
 
 Social Security 
 
The RADAR survey did not provide direct estimates of social security wealth, or individual 
earnings. However, it did provide other household information, such as age, level of education, 
employment status and occupation for both household heads and their spouses. We use this 
information to impute values for these key asset components using the fact that the SS 
entitlements in Japan are individually-based.  
 
We compute both social security and occupational pension wealth accumulations using the 
Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) approach rather than a Projected Benefit Obligation 
(PBO) approach. The ABO value has the advantage that social security and pension entitlements 
earned to date are thus computed in a manner consistent with the valuation of other assets. All 
the ABO values were converted into millions of constant yen in 2000 using CPI indexation and 
1% net assumed investment return (AIR%).  
 
In Japan, social security is vested after 25 years contributions. We have assumed that this occurs 
at age 45 for everyone. For this reason, there is a sudden jump of SS wealth between age group 
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40-44 and 45-49. The ABO of household social security consists of two components – a basic 
pension, and an earning related component called EPI. 
 
For simplicities, we assume throughout that in multi-person households, the primary workers are 
males. Survivor benefits accrue only to females. 
 
1. Basic Pension (BP) 
We assume that all employees meet the 25 years of contribution requirement. The wives’ 
basic pension wealth is determined by the accumulated years of contribution of their 
husbands at the point of observation. 
 
Annual BP benefit 
= (Maximum monthly benefit x Months of coverage) / 480   if YOS >= 25 years 9 
 
Also actuarial reduction will be applied to those beneficiaries who are younger than  age 
65. For example, 72% of the maximum is paid at age 62 and 58% at age 60 10 
 
Finally, the ABO of Basic Pension is calculated by using the appropriate life annuity 
factor 
)12(
xa
••
.  In actuarial notation,  
)12(
xa
••
 is the present value of annuity of 1 per annum, 
payable monthly in advance, payable to individual X [age, gender] until death.  
 
The annuity factors are evaluated using recursive formulae together with monthly 
payment adjustment.  
 
1
1 1
=
⋅⋅+=
∞
••
+
••••
a
apva zxx  
 
where )1/(1 iv += , the discount rate i is assumed to be 1%; xp  is the probability for an 
age exact x  to survive to age 1+x . 11  And the monthly payment annuity due factor 
)12(
xa
••
 
will be estimated approximately.12 
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11)12(
−=
••••
xx aa  
  
2. Employment Pension Insurance (EPI) 
The RADAR data do not report labour earnings of individuals, so ABOs of EPI were 
allocated based on an imputed salary. We estimate the household head’s salary from age-
earnings profiles for individuals in 2000, differentiated by educational level, published by 
the Japanese Depart of Labour.13 
 
Annual EPI benefit = career average indexed salary * f * years in coverage. 14 
 
Where f is the EPI accrued rate, 0.75% in 1994 and changed to 0.7125% in 2000. 
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Again, appropriate life annuity factors were used to calculate ABO of EPIs. 
  
3. Survivor Benefit in EPI 
According to Japan social security legislation, it is possible for widows to get extra EPI 
benefits upon the death of their spouses. In order to avoid double counting, the model 
only estimates the extra survivors’ benefit, which is the maximum of the three pension 
options available to her under Japanese regulations, less her own EPI pension.15 We 
ignore any previous transitional regulations for the sake of simplicity. 
 
Thus, the ABO of survivor benefit in EPI  
=   )12(|WHa
••
* (maximum of three options – own EPI ) 16 
where )12(|WHa
••
 is the present value of annuity of 1 per year payable monthly to Wife after 
the death of Husband. It is also called Reversionary Annuity Factor. 
 
 Occupational Pension  
There is almost no information on corporate pensions in the RADAR survey. We 
therefore made use of estimated present values of pensions reported in Usuki (2003).17  
These are distinguished by Tenure (years in service) and educational level. We assume 
that all salary earners belonged to a corporate pension plan, using the salary flag in the 
RADAR data set to identify these individuals, along with their educational level.  
 
We also assume that each salary earner has an average tenure according to Labor 
statistics 2000, differentiated by age, gender, level of education and size of firms. 
 
Data used are reproduced below:  
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Tenure 2001 
Years in Service College Graduates 
High School 
Graduate 
0 0.0 0.0 
5 455.0 274.0 
10 1,562.0 876.0 
15 3,715.0 2,100.0 
20 7,735.0 4,232.0 
25 13,380.0 7,032.0 
30 21,725.0 11,393.0 
35 26,032.8 16,349.0 
40 27,295.0 18,625.0 
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Table 1:  Household Wealth in 2000: Japan, Europe, and the US (in 2002 €) 
 
 Japan Europe US 
Financial wealth per household 
 
€180967 €119985 €270986 
Financial wealth as percentage of disposable 
income 
 
 
439% 
 
338% 
 
405% 
Financial liabilities as percentage of 
disposable income 
 
99.9% 86.5% 89.8% 
Residential property wealth 
 
€121181 €105315 €103705 
Residential property as percentage of financial 
wealth 
 
67.0% 87.8% 38.3% 
 
Source: Babeau and Sbano (2003), Tables 3, 4, 28, and 38. Price conversion at Purchasing Power Parity, end 2002.  
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Table 2:  Comparison of Composition of Aggregate Household Financial Wealth  
(end 2000; in %) 
 
 Japan  Europe  US 
Currency and deposits 
 
 
11.4  10.1    1.1   
Time deposits, saving deposits and others 41.4  17.3    9.9   
Money market funds 0.2  0.8    3.1   
Securities other than shares 4.5  6.8    6.4   
Shares and other equity 8.3  21.3    33.1   
Mutual funds 2.4  9.5    12.9   
Life insurance 17.7  17.2    7.1   
Pension funds 9.7  10.7    23.8   
Others 4.4 
 
6.2    2.5   
Total 100.0  100.0    100.0   
  Source:  Babeau and Sbano (2003): Table 21. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for RADAR Analysis Sample (2000) 
 
Social 
security 
wealth 
Housing 
equity 
Corporate 
pension 
wealth 
Equity 
assets 
Nonequity 
assets 
Total 
wealth 
Monthly 
income Variables 
millions of constant yen in 2000 1000 yen 
Mean 23.52 24.05 6.00 1.21 8.76 66.60 706 
Median 20.80 8.60 3.10 0.00 3.50 51.40 650 
Std. Err. 23.12 63.08 6.85 4.54 13.74 84.59 471 
Min. 0.00 -455.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 -450.00 50 
Max. 72.10 977.60 33.50 50.00 100.00 1125.40 5000 
 
Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Table 4.  Probit Models of Equity and Housing Wealth Holding (0,1) 
Dep.Var: Equity holding  
Group: single male Group: single female Group: couples
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
education_m 0.259 0.125 2.06 education_f 0.287 0.178 1.61 education_m 0.203 0.037 5.45
employ_m -0.297 0.435 -0.68 employ_f -0.031 0.412 -0.08 employ_m -0.629 0.129 -4.86
income 0.031 0.046 0.68 income 0.161 0.060 2.69 education_f 0.046 0.046 1
salary_based -0.879 0.311 -2.82 salary_based -0.991 0.418 -2.37 employ_f -0.206 0.069 -2.99
35-44 0.498 0.318 1.57 35-44 -0.153 0.459 -0.33 income 0.159 0.018 8.87
45-54 0.257 0.419 0.61 45-54 0.139 0.441 0.31 income^2 -0.003 0.000 -5.94
55-64 1.064 0.436 2.44 55-64 0.248 0.494 0.5 salary_based 0.157 0.107 1.47
65-74 -0.082 0.610 -0.13 65-74 0.358 0.576 0.62 35-44 0.172 0.131 1.31
cons -1.437 0.597 -2.41 cons -2.159 0.711 -3.04 45-54 0.482 0.129 3.72
55-64 0.920 0.134 6.89
65-75 0.797 0.161 4.96
cons -2.403 0.200 -12
Nobs=221 Nobs= 224 Nobs=2021
Log likelihood = -67.07 Log likelihood = -57.22 Log likelihood = -971.10
Pseudo R2       =     0.183 Pseudo R2       =     0.151 Pseudo R2       =     0.162
Dep.Var: Own Housing  
Group: single male Group: single female Group: couples
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
education_m 0.153 0.086 1.77 education_f -0.013 0.129 -0.1 education_m 0.025 0.038 0.66
employ_m -0.803 0.374 -2.15 employ_f -0.180 0.306 -0.59 employ_m -0.967 0.181 -5.34
income 0.094 0.042 2.23 income 0.094 0.052 1.82 education_f -0.014 0.049 -0.28
salary_based 0.053 0.273 0.19 salary_based 0.161 0.319 0.51 employ_f 0.068 0.071 0.96
35-44 0.321 0.264 1.22 35-44 -0.152 0.277 -0.55 income 0.133 0.019 6.89
45-54 -0.227 0.329 -0.69 45-54 -0.490 0.311 -1.58 income^2 -0.003 0.001 -4.68
55-64 0.201 0.383 0.53 55-64 0.169 0.407 0.41 salary_based 0.066 0.107 0.61
65-74 -0.058 0.464 -0.13 65-74 0.472 0.468 1.01 35-44 0.372 0.099 3.75
cons 0.143 0.469 0.3 cons 0.438 0.513 0.85 45-54 0.898 0.106 8.46
55-64 1.343 0.124 10.82
65-75 1.407 0.172 8.18
cons 0.001 0.213 0.01
Nobs= 221 Nobs =220 Nobs=2014
Log likelihood = -136.15 Log likelihood = -119.65 Log likelihood = -895.14
Pseudo R2       =     0.059 Pseudo R2       =     0.041 Pseudo R2       =     0.183  
Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Table 5. Tobit Models of Wealth Level by Asset Type: Pooled Sample 
Dependent Variable: Equity wealth
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
married -0.885 2.503 -0.350 married -3.120 2.909 -1.070
education 2.555 0.897 2.850 education 2.619 0.890 2.940
employ 0.172 0.931 0.180 employ 0.079 0.926 0.090
sex 1.371 1.791 0.770 sex 1.752 1.798 0.970
income 1.269 0.155 8.170 income 0.866 0.318 2.720
income^2 -0.020 0.004 -4.800 income^2 -0.022 0.004 -4.980
salary_based -2.945 0.860 -3.420 salary_based -2.906 0.860 -3.380
35-44 1.589 1.159 1.370 35-44 1.695 1.163 1.460
45-54 4.132 1.146 3.600 45-54 4.230 1.150 3.680
55-64 9.160 1.181 7.750 55-64 9.217 1.184 7.780
65-74 10.816 1.337 8.090 65-74 10.981 1.345 8.160
cons -27.788 2.593 -10.720 marriedxincom 0.463 0.320 1.450
_se 10.389 0.334 NA cons -26.352 2.734 -9.640
_se 10.382 0.333 NA
Nobs=1903 (574 censored) Nobs=1903 (574 censored)
Log likelihood = -2752.28 Log likelihood = -2751.2
Pseudo R2= 0.077 Pseudo R2= 0.077
Dependent Variable: Housing Wealth
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
married 12.182 13.597 0.900 married 32.660 16.402 1.990
education 8.413 5.420 1.550 education 6.896 5.460 1.260
employ -4.029 5.622 -0.720 employ -2.188 5.675 -0.390
sex 8.559 11.376 0.750 sex 2.384 11.639 0.200
income 1.046 0.959 1.090 income 4.136 1.967 2.100
income^2 0.193 0.027 7.030 income^2 0.211 0.028 7.570
salary_based -27.308 5.131 -5.320 salary_based -28.774 5.113 -5.630
35-44 30.451 7.237 4.210 35-44 31.341 7.201 4.350
45-54 60.219 7.083 8.500 45-54 61.751 7.062 8.740
55-64 87.404 7.178 12.180 55-64 88.294 7.141 12.360
65-74 92.911 8.045 11.550 65-74 70.968 10.426 6.810
cons -84.829 14.602 -5.810 marriedxincom -4.267 1.968 -2.170
_se 67.351 1.545 NA incomex65-74 3.531 1.135 3.110
cons -91.588 15.625 -5.860
 _se 66.880 1.535 NA
Nobs=1621 (609 censored) Nobs=1612 (609 censored)
Log likelihood = -5959.28 Log likelihood = -5951.99
Pseudo R2=0.057 Pseudo R2= 0.058  
Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Table 6. Tobit Models of Wealth Levels by Asset and Household Type 
Dep.Var.: Equity wealth
Group: single males Group: single females Group: couples
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
education_m 0.98 0.71 1.37 education_f 4.12 2.01 2.05 education_m 2.24 0.36 6.17
employ_m -1.02 2.46 -0.42 employ_f 0.91 4.57 0.20 employ_m -7.38 1.20 -6.14
income 0.23 0.26 0.88 income 1.61 0.72 2.23 education_f -0.03 0.44 -0.07
salary_based -6.38 1.82 -3.50 salary_based -9.33 4.80 -1.94 employ_f -2.10 0.66 -3.17
35-44 3.18 1.84 1.73 35-44 -0.61 5.12 -0.12 income 1.53 0.17 9.15
45-54 1.08 2.46 0.44 45-54 5.59 4.67 1.20 income^2 -0.03 0.00 -5.63
55-64 7.98 2.40 3.33 55-64 4.97 5.45 0.91 salary_base 0.68 1.03 0.66
65-74 -1.68 3.50 -0.48 65-74 8.20 6.37 1.29 35-44 1.44 1.33 1.09
cons -6.86 3.58 -1.91 cons -30.23 9.05 -3.34 45-54 4.10 1.30 3.15
_se 5.88 0.90 NA _se 11.07 1.95 NA 55-64 7.89 1.34 5.90
65-75 8.66 1.56 5.56
cons -22.34 2.04 -10.94
_se 10.18 0.34 NA
Nobs=221 (194 censored) Nobs=224  (204 censored) Nobs=2021 (1495 censored)
Log likelihood = -125.77 Log likelihood = -109.84 Log likelihood = -2466.14
Pseudo R2       =     0.141 Pseudo R2       =     0.091 Pseudo R2       =     0.079
Dep.Var.: Non-equity financial weal   
Group: single males Group: single females Group: couples
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
education_m 0.52 0.59 0.88 education_f 1.70 0.73 2.31 education_m 0.74 0.30 2.44
employ_m -6.64 2.38 -2.79 employ_f -2.36 1.76 -1.34 employ_m -6.02 1.14 -5.26
income 0.95 0.25 3.82 income 1.16 0.27 4.30 education_f 0.97 0.40 2.46
salary_based 2.70 1.89 1.43 salary_based -4.14 1.85 -2.24 employ_f -0.32 0.58 -0.55
under 44 -13.67 2.96 -4.61 under 44 -3.41 2.41 -1.41 income 0.96 0.06 14.96
45-54 -10.23 3.34 -3.06 45-54 -1.11 2.44 -0.45 income^2 -1.31 0.86 -1.51
55-64 -10.77 3.55 -3.03 55-64 7.96 2.45 3.25 salary_base -24.99 2.95 -8.47
cons 15.04 3.03 4.96 cons 3.42 1.95 1.76 35-44 -24.12 2.95 -8.18
_se 8.99 0.43 NA _se 8.20 0.39 NA 45-54 -16.12 2.91 -5.53
55-64 -12.35 2.88 -4.29
65-75 24.98 2.86 8.73
_se 12.34 0.20 NA
Nobs=221 (4 censored) Nob = 220  (0 censored) Nobs=2021 (31uncensored)
Log likelihood = -787.49 Log likelihood = -789.21 Log likelihood = -7856.10
Pseudo R2       =     0.037 Pseudo R2       =     0.045 Pseudo R2       =     0.039
Dep. Var.: Social Security wealth  
Group: single males Group: single females Group: couples
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
education_m 1.660 0.506 3.28 education_f 0.268 0.481 0.56 education_m 2.558 0.274 9.35
employ_m 4.989 1.464 3.41 employ_f 14.501 0.905 16 employ_m 5.759 0.875 6.59
income 0.185 0.184 1 income 0.327 0.135 2.4 education_f -0.809 0.364 -2.22
salary_based -2.313 1.214 -1.9 salary_based -2.338 0.962 -2.4 employ_f 7.317 0.535 13.67
under44 -54.245 NA NA under44 -41.592 NA NA income 0.222 0.052 4.32
45-54 -4.910 1.501 -3.3 45-54 -0.327 0.982 -0.3 salary_base -0.934 0.711 -1.31
55-64 6.309 1.586 3.98 55-64 5.104 0.937 5.45 under34 -108.899 NA NA
cons 17.457 1.780 9.81 cons 6.440 0.917 7.02 35-44 -63.506 2.418 -26.27
_se 3.770 0.381 NA _se 2.966 0.227 NA 45-54 -10.611 2.187 -4.85
55-64 7.864 2.157 3.65
65-74 6.398 2.125 3.01
cons 29.954 2.144 13.97
_se 9.111 0.182 NA
Nobs=221 (172 censored) Nobs=220 (139censored) Nobs=2021  (752 censored)
Log likelihood = -134.55 Log likelihood = -213.02 Log likelihood = -4656.71
Pseudo R2       =     0.574 Pseudo R2       =     0.535 Pseudo R2       =     0.334
Dep.Var.: Housing wealth  
Group: single males Group: single females Group: couples
Coeff. Std.Err z-stat Coefficient Std.Err z-stat Coeff. Std.Err z-stat
education_m 0.31 5.38 0.06 education_f 6.43 7.14 0.90 education_m 3.97 2.24 1.77
employ_m -33.46 17.83 -1.88 employ_f 0.50 13.57 0.04 employ_m -26.97 7.54 -3.58
income 7.74 1.91 4.04 income 5.99 2.19 2.73 education_f 1.56 2.86 0.55
salary_based -8.62 14.65 -0.59 salary_based -19.52 13.17 -1.48 employ_f 6.24 4.28 1.46
35-44 48.43 16.32 2.97 35-44 28.46 16.57 1.72 income 0.94 1.05 0.90
45-54 31.87 18.70 1.70 45-54 21.01 16.86 1.25 income^2 0.20 0.03 6.82
55-64 78.64 19.92 3.95 55-64 60.61 18.08 3.35 salary_base -21.43 6.11 -3.51
65-74 46.85 21.36 2.19 65-74 56.41 22.23 2.54 35-44 29.23 8.33 3.51
cons -51.30 26.51 -1.94 cons -62.02 28.34 -2.19 45-54 61.79 8.15 7.59
_se 49.35 5.64 NA _se 38.56 4.66 NA 55-64 86.43 8.24 10.49
65-75 86.43 9.54 9.06
cons -50.26 11.58 -4.34
_se 68.53 1.64 NA
Nobs=125  (80 censored) Nobs=97  (56 censored) Nobs=1385  (472 censored)
Log likelihood = -269.70 Log likelihood = -234.42 Log likelihood = -5406.38
Pseudo R2       =     0.084 Pseudo R2       =     0.068 Pseudo R2       =     0.055  
 
Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Table 7. OLS Models of Total Wealth: Pooled Sample 
Dep.Var.: Total Wealth Dep.Var.: Total Wealth
Coefficient Std.Err z-stat Coefficient Std.Err z-stat
married 6.655 10.990 0.610 married 1.058 6.322 0.170
education 9.214 4.444 2.070 education 5.234 2.282 2.290
employ 4.842 4.667 1.040 employment 1.199 2.499 0.480
sex 12.913 9.259 1.390 sex 3.947 5.287 0.750
salary_based -12.493 4.635 -2.700 income 6.084 1.345 4.520
35-44 -3.255 5.283 -0.620 salary_based -26.455 6.416 -4.120
45-54 62.766 5.212 12.040 35-44 -13.693 3.958 -3.460
55-64 109.276 5.553 19.680 45-54 41.364 4.779 8.660
65-74 100.993 6.738 14.990 55-64 89.899 5.336 16.850
cons -31.027 11.807 -2.630 65-74 57.335 18.607 3.080
incomex65-74 6.086 3.739 1.630
cons -17.357 7.824 -2.220
Nobs=1756 Nobs=1746
R2 = 0.346 Adj.R2=0.342  R2=0.474 Adj.R=0.471
Dep.Var.: Total Wealth Dep.Var.:Ln(Total Wealth)
Coefficient Std.Err z-stat Coefficient Std.Err z-stat
married 7.208 5.980 1.210 married 0.265 0.179 1.480
education 7.062 2.178 3.240 education 0.127 0.070 1.810
employment 1.430 2.475 0.580 employment 0.142 0.155 0.920
sex 8.091 5.049 1.600 sex -0.005 0.071 -0.060
income -0.426 2.109 -0.200 log_income 0.493 0.051 9.620
income^2 0.207 0.094 2.200 salary_based -0.204 0.080 -2.560
salary_based -18.990 5.782 -3.280 35-44 0.798 0.098 8.110
35-44 -7.059 3.319 -2.130 45-54 2.534 0.089 28.470
45-54 49.631 4.433 11.190 55-64 3.123 0.091 34.140
55-64 96.119 3.866 24.860 65-74 3.139 0.111 28.180
65-74 57.840 22.316 2.590 cons 0.088 0.195 0.450
incomex65-7 6.590 4.451 1.480
cons -11.870 8.229 -1.440  
Nobs=1746 Nobs=1696
R2=0.499 Adj.R2=0.495 R2=0.720 Adj.R2= 0.718  
Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Chart 1: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 
(Median Value)
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Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Chart 2a: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Type: Couple_FW_Wife
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Chart 2b: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Type: Couple_PW_Wife
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Chart 2c: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Type: Couple_HouseWife
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Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Chart 3a: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Type: SingleMale
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Chart 3b: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Type: SingleFemale
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Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Chart 4a: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Income: Rich
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
 less 30 30~34 35~39 40~44 45~49 50~54 55~59 60~64 Over 65
Age
A
SS
ET
S 
( M
ill
io
n 
Ye
n)
Other Financial Assets
Equity
Corporate Pension
Home Equity
Social Security
 
Chart 4b: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Income: Middle
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Chart 4c: Life Cycle Asset Levels and Allocation in Japan 2000 (Median)
 HH Income: Poor
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Source: Authors’ computations from 2000 RADAR survey; see Appendix. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 Recent references on the pension system include Clark and Mitchell (2002); Cerulli Associates 
(2001, 2003); Nikko Financial Intelligence (2003), Shimada et al. (2002); and Usuki (2003). 
2 See for instance the articles in Blomstrom et al. (2003). 
3 This reduces the usable sample size to about 1,800 for our regression analysis. 
4 Additional data were generously provided by Masaharu Usuki via personal communication. 
5 The questionnaire asks only about face value of the life insurance policy without any maturity 
date; additional clarification will be sought in future surveys. As Table 2 suggests, this may be a 
major omission for Japan, where life insurance is in aggregate has been valued at 17% of total 
financial wealth. In future research, we hope to develop an adequate approach to its valuation.  
6 While we provide a lifecycle interpretation of our findings, we are award that with cross-
section data, age and cohort effects are conflated. We hope to explore this point further in future 
research. 
7 We also caution the reader that some cells have only a small number of observations. 
8 See http://www.nqi.co.jp/english/needs/n_top.html 
9 The maximum BP monthly benefit was taken from page 22 Takayama (1998). The maximum 
benefit in 2000 is JPY 67017. 
10 See also Table 2.2 on page 23, Takayama (1998) for detailed actuarial reduction rate.  
11 See also Japan Life Table 2000 
12 See Bowers (1997, p 151) for more details. 
13 Please refer to http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/database/db-l/index.html  for details 
14 The EPI accrual rate 0.75% was replaced by a time series (Takayama 1998, p 23) 
15 Three options for survivors.  (1) Her own EPI only (2) ¾ of husband’s EPI (3) 2/3 of 
husband’s EPI plus ½ of her own EPI.   
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16 See Bowers (1997), p 285 for more details 
17 Additional data were generously provided by Masaharu Usuki via personal communication. 
